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1 Introduction
It is fair to say that leadership in organizations is not a topic that has received a lot
of attention by economists. It is only very recently that a small but rapidly growing
economics literature on leadership has emerged. The goal of this survey article is to
review this literature and to consider how the leadership problem is embedded in the
broader context of the managerial theory of the rm.
It is not just the notion of leadership that is foreign to most economists. Even the
raison dêtre of rms in a market economy, the boundaries of rms, and their internal
organization is still imperfectly understood. For a long time economists have simply
represented rms as a black box, or a production function turning inputs such as labor
and raw materials into outputs for consumption. As ?, ?, ?, and ? have pointed out,
the di¢ culty with this representation of rms is that it leaves unanswered the role of
rms in a market economy and what the boundaries of the rm should be.
The modern economic theory of the rm pioneered by these authors and others
has started addressing these issues, by opening this black box, and representing the
rm as a machine operated by a manager. What is now known as the Principal-Agent
approach has dominated recent economic analysis of rms. In its simplest represen-
tation, the Principal is the owner of the rm and the agent is the rms manager.
In a few more sophisticated representations the owner of the rm is the head of a
hierarchy of managers and workers. The central issue addressed in this literature is
an incentive issue: how to align managersobjectives with those of shareholders (or
other stakeholders). Under this approach the basic organization design problem boils
down to a contracting problem between the principal and agent, where the principal
(or owner) determines the plan of action for the rm as well as a compensation package
for the agent (or manager), and the manager executes the plan. In other words, the
principal-agent approach to the rm makes no room for leadership. What is worse, it
makes no room for any signicant role for management, as the strategy and operation
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of the rm is determined in the initial contract between the principal and agent, so
that the only role of the manager is to execute the pre-determined strategy. In the
basic theory there is no room for initiative by the manager, let alone for any leadership
role by management.
Although the Principal-Agent paradigm is a major advance over the neoclassical
black-box representation of rms, it is nevertheless decient and unrealistic. Indeed,
more often than not shareholders are in reality looking for guidance by the manager and
not the other way around. Similarly, when a rm appoints a new CEO, it may dene
in broad terms the CEOs compensation package, but otherwise gives carte blanche to
the CEO in dening and implementing the rms strategy (subject, of course, to the
approval of the board of directors).
Thus, a more accurate representation than the Principal-Agent model, of how man-
agers run rms, is to allow for some form of managerial initiative and a leadership role
for the CEO. Introducing managerial leadership into the modern economic theory of
the rm, however, involves a major departure from the Principal-Agent model of the
rm.
A rst step in that direction is to introduce incomplete contracts as Grossman
and Hart (1986) have done, so that the entire future of the corporation is no longer
determined in a single contract between the owners and the manager. With incomplete
contracts, not all decisions are made at the time when the contract is signed. As a
consequence, the manager has more of a role than just executing what has been agreed.
That is, in situations when the manager has control rights he gets to determine how
to run the rm when new decision problems arise.
But in reality, CEOs dont always have such formal control rights and yet they are
expected to play a leadership role in the rm. To be able to account for an initiative
role of CEOs even when they do not have formal control of the rm, the property
rights theory of the rm of Grossman-Hart-Moore has to be augmented to introduce
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the notion of delegation of authority as Aghion and Tirole (1997) have shown.
We begin our discussion of economistsperspectives on leadership in organizations
by briey reviewing the role of incomplete contracts, formal control rights and del-
egation of real authority to CEOs with superior expertise or information, as these
elements provide the underpinnings that connect the economic models of leadership to
the theory of the rm.
Second, we turn to a review of the rst generation of economic analyses on leadership
and discuss the question of what leadership means to an economist. As we shall
see, economistsnotions of leadership are much more basic and elementary than the
leadership notions discussed in the voluminous management, sociology, organizational
psychology and organizational behavior literatures. However, this does not mean that
this burgeoning economics literature should be dismissed as too simplistic or naïve to
be of any practical interest. The value of economistsmodeling e¤orts lies in the focus
on the functional aspects of leadership, the mechanisms of leadership, and on what
leadership can accomplish for an organization.
Third, after reviewing the main approaches to leadership explored by economists, we
outline a general conceptual framework that, in our view, captures some key elements
of leadership that economists have focused on. We discuss the key attributes of a leader
that are captured by this framework and attempt to identify which important facets
it leaves out. We also touch on possible ways of extending the basic framework to
incorporate the main missing dimensions of leadership.
To give a rst avor of the aspects of leadership which the economic framework is
set-up to capture and which it is not, consider the perspectives on leadership recently
o¤ered by one of the leading US corporate executives, Richard Parsons (CEO of Time
Warner), in a lecture at Columbia Business School.1 Parsons identies ve main ele-
1See Parsons Speaks on Elements of Leadership, 5 December 2007
by Aynesley Toole, The Bottom Line, Columbia Business School, see e.g.
http://www.socialwork.columbia.edu/wedseries/spr08/parsons.html
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ments of e¤ective leadership in corporations: 1) Set a Vision; 2) Communication; 3)
Empower others; 4) Execution; and 5) Integrity. This may not be an all-encompassing
view of leadership, but it includes several elements that are likely to be on many other
CEOs or commentatorslists. In particular the vision thing has to be a basic attribute
of a leader. This is indeed one important aspect that economists have focused on.
Communication also has to be an integral part of leadership, as a leaders vision can
help coordinate an organizations activities around a common goal only if it is clearly
and convincingly communicated to all the agents in the organization. Interestingly,
Parsons stresses not only the importance of the leader conveying a clear and e¤ective
message to all the members of the organization, but also the two-way street part of
communication and the importance of getting good feedback, ideas and information
from others. Again, economists have suggested and discussed similar aspects.
By empowering others, Parsons means that an e¤ective leader cannot take on the
whole burden of running a large organization onto himself and has to be able to delegate
to other collaborators in the organization specic managerial roles. This is clearly an
important aspect of leadership, but also one that often poses a di¢ cult dilemma for the
CEO, as the e¤ectiveness of leadership would be undermined if the organization speaks
with several voices or if delegation of important leadership roles to young turks invites
the most successful and gifted among them to challenge the leader. As important as
this aspect of leadership is, it has not received any attention by economists (with a few
recent exceptions in the political economy literature).
The fourth element on Parsonslist, execution, refers to the responsibility of a leader
for seeing things through and for getting his vision implemented. Parsons also alludes to
the fact that a leader should be accountable for failing to successfully implementing his
mission statement. Accountability is an essential aspect of leadership that economists
have also highlighted. However, the execution and monitoring role of a leader has
generally not been emphasized in the economics literature and clearly merits further
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attention.
Finally, the fth element, integrity, is a very important and often stressed quality
of a good leader in the management literature. An e¤ective leader should do what he
thinks is right and not be overly inuenced by market sentiment, or by the changing
moods of the common wisdom of the time. As we shall see, the economics literature has
also focused on some facets of this element, in particular the idea that a good leader
follows his own convictions and is not unduly inuenced by othersopinions. However,
part of the notion of integrity is also that a leader should be honest to himself and
should not cave in to the inuence of powerful members of the organization or to
controlling shareholders, particularly if he thinks that they are wrong and are trying
to steer the organization in the wrong direction. If a leader is unable to resist such
pressures or is seen to kowtow to the dominant line, he will loose his power to convince
others to follow him. This aspect of integrity is essentially absent from the economics
literature, but it is also not clear whether economists have much to say about it.
2 Control, Delegation and Leadership
The starting point for Grossman and Harts (1986) property-rights theory of the rm
is the assumption of contractual incompleness. When contracts are incomplete, new
decisions have to be taken or new agreements have to be reached in contingencies
not covered by the contract. In their theory, the party who has control, the owner,
takes these not pre-specied decisions. As noted in the introduction, although their
framework can account for the notion of control rights and the importance of ownership,
it cannot explain any role for management unless the manager has formal control. To
be able to introduce a role for management even when managers do not have formal
ownership of the rm, one has to allow for the possibility of delegation of authority by
the owners to the manager.
This is not as straightforward as it appears, for the delegation of authority has to
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be credible. The owner must nd a way to commit not to overrule the manager, or
not to re the CEO if she does not like what he proposes to do. Although economic
models of leadership do not make this explicit, any notion of leadership obviously rests
rst on the ability of the rms owners to credibly commit to delegate auhtority to the
CEO. To give an example, it will be crucial for the ability of the Wall Street Journals
new managing editor whether its new owner Rupert Murdoch will be able to credibly
delegate editorial authority to the editor. How can this delegation be made credible
without transferring formal control?
This is the question that ? set out to address. Their proposed answer is that
delegation can be credible if the CEO acquires information or expertise superior to the
owners. In particular, when shareholders are widely dispersed and removed from the
day-to-day operations of the rm, then the CEO naturally gains real authority over
the rm and can begin to assume a leadership role. Aghion and Tirole mainly consider
a model with two players, where each player can rst invest in information and where
at a subsequent stage the two agents have to make a decision on which direction to
take their organization. In their setup agents may or may not get a valuable piece of
information, and the probability of getting that information is higher the more they
invest in information acquisition. If one of the agents has formal control and gets the
relevant piece of information then that agent makes the ultimate decision about which
direction to take the company. If the agent with formal authority does not get the
piece of information, but the other agent does, then the uninformed agent defers to the
informed agent even when he has all the control rights.
This is the sense in which expertise or superior information can give real authority
to a manager who has no formal control rights. The extent to which the manager will
have real control in their model depends on two key parameters: the relative costs of
information acquisition for each player and the congruence of their objectives (or, the
extent to which they have aligned interests). If a CEO has di¤erent goals than the
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investor(s), the latter may want to retain formal control, so as to ensure that they get
their way at least some of the time. In other words, one reason why shareholders do
not want to relinquish formal control is that they then get to monitor the CEO and
thus can avoid the worst excesses of CEO power. But holding on to power in this way
comes at a cost. It undermines the CEOs incentives to acquire information. Or, to
put it in context of our broader discussion on leadership, formal control in the hands
of shareholders may undermine the CEOs ability to be an e¤ective leader, as the other
members of the organization may worry that the mission statement of the CEO may
not be carried out and could be blocked in the future by the board of directors.
As Aghion and Tirole show, the desirability of holding on to formal control and the
power to overrule the CEO is less valuable the more congruent the CEOs preferences
are with the owners. Similarly, the more the CEOs goals are aligned with the owners,
the less the owners will want to invest in information themselves and the more likely
the CEO will be to gain real authority by investing in information himself. The owners
may even prefer to give up formal control to the CEO, for example by letting the
CEO hand-pick his own board of directors, as a way of commiting not to interfere
and thus maximizing the CEOs incentives to invest in information. This admittedly
extreme outcome provides an important insight, which is not generally stressed in
either the literature on leadership or corporate governance. Namely, that an important
prerequisite for successful leadership by a CEO may be a weak board, and generally a
weak governance structure. For example, when the nancial press criticized the board
of General Electric (GE) for granting excessive pay, pension contributions, and perks to
its departing CEO, Jack Welch, there were virtually no commentators pointing out that
these excesses may have been the price to pay for the exceptional leadership benets
that Jack Welch was able to bring to GE.
In an interesing recent study Song (2007) looks at CEO-Board congruence and
considers the di¤erence in performance of rms with more or less congruent CEOs
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and boards. He nds that rm performance is positively correlated with CEO-board
alignment and also with CEO longevity. This is consistent with the view that when
the board is more friendly to the CEO, the latters leadership is more credible and
therefore more e¤ective.
Of course, for every Jack Welch one can nd a Konrad Black, the former CEO of the
newspaper empire Hollinger International, who has been sentenced for corporate fraud
in February 2008. In Konrad Blacks case, a more independent and watchful board
might in all likelihood have been able to prevent the worst excesses he committed
without inhibiting his leadership (see the Breeden Report (2004)? for a description
of the dysfunctional board meetings at Hollinger under Konrad Blacks leadership).
Corporations thus face an important dilemma: on the one hand they need to ensure
that the corporation is well governed by monitoring the CEO, but on the other hand
they also need to make room for managerial leadership and give CEOs the scope to
commit to an overall strategy for the rm as a whole. If, as a result of too much board
meddling, the CEOs actions and communication are stied, the sense of commitment
to a clear strategy may be compromised and the rm may perform poorly as a result,
thus defeating the whole purpose of CEO oversight.
This dilemma is particularly acute at the level of the board of directors. The trend
in corporate governance at the level of the board of directors has been towards ever
greater independence and accountability of the CEO to the board. While the benets
of this trend in terms of better monitoring are clear, insu¢ cient consideration has been
given to the implications of this trend for the ability of CEOs to fulll their leadership
role. If anything, the economic analysis of CEO leadership in the next sections points
away from independence and toward greater CEO accountability and more sensitive
long-term performance-based compensation.
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3 First Generation Models of Leadership
3.1 Leadership, communication and continual improvement
Perhaps the earliest economic analysis on leadership in organizations is by ?. A main
goal of their article is to propose a rst rigorous formulation of what leadership is,
how it works, and what it can achieve for an organization. Inevitably, given this
objective, their focus is narrower than the broad picture and the ve main elements
of leadership suggested by Parsons. Rotemberg and Saloners proposed view of the
leadership problem in an organization is that the leaders objective is to try to motivate
the other agents in the rm (the followers) to perform. Thus, just as in the Principal-
Agent problem we have mentioned abovewhere the principals problem is to incentivize
the agent to performthe leaders problem is to get the followers to exert e¤ort to nd
and propose improvements to the rms overall performance.
Their setup focuses mainly on the communication element of leadership and specif-
ically on a bottom-up vision of leadership, where the leader gets to induce followers to
exert e¤ort in nding improvements by listening to their proposals and by being open
to their suggestions. The very prospect that their suggestions for improvement might
be carefully evaluated and taken into account by the leader is a su¢ cient incentive in
their model to get followers to exert costly e¤ort. Thus, the fundamental leadership
problem they consider is the question of how a leader can credibly become a good
listener or communicator. How do followers trust that the leader listens to them when
they have already exerted costly e¤ort to nd and propose improvements?
Rotemberg and Saloner suggest an idea that is related to the problem of delegation
of authority in Aghion and Tirole. They argue that if the leaders objective is mainly
to maximize short-term prots he will not always engage in costly communication with
the followers, or he will not implement their proposed improvements as often. Just
as the agent with formal authority in Aghion and Tirole can deter the other agent
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from investing in information, the prot-maximizing leader may deter followers from
exerting costly e¤ort to nd and propose improvements. In contrast, if the leader has
the welfare of the whole organization at heartas Japanese CEOs who typically follow
a lifetime career at their rmthen he can get followers to exert more e¤ort. As one
might expect, for some parameter values in their model, this Toyota-way leadership
model can dominate the more bottom-line oriented American approach to leadership
even in terms of protability.
The kaizen (or continual improvement) model successfully applied by Toyota has
been a major managerial innovation in the past quarter century. It has led to fun-
damental changes in automobile manufacturing around the world and it has been an
inspiration for many corporations in other sectors. The Rotemberg and Saloner ar-
ticle proposes an interesting rst model of a key aspect of what kaizen means and
points to an important prerequisite for its implementation: a long-term orientation of
management and good communication between employees and management. While it
emphasizes one of the ve elements of leadership, the Rotemberg and Saloner model
leaves out all other key aspects of leadership, howeverin particular the role of the leader
in determining a direction or strategy for the rm and thus helping to coordinate the
organizations activities around a common goal.
In a later article, ? extend this model by introducing a role for the leader to
dene a general direction for the organization. The leader, in their model, does this by
outlining in advance which future courses of action the company is unlikely to pursue.
For Toyota this might mean announcing that the company will not get involved in
any software operating system development for its automobiles and that the company
plans to outsource all such information technology activities. The benet of limiting the
rms activities in this way is that employees will not waste their e¤orts pursuing too
many leads. It can also help coordinate multiple improvements proposed by di¤erent
workers on the same production process. As Rotemberg and Saloner emphasize, a
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visionary leader, who is able to detect early which directions are worth pursuing could
bring enormous benets to the organization by clearly communicating the general
direction the company will take. An obvious example of what the authors have in
mind is Toyotas early commitment to the development of a low-cost electric motor for
automobiles, and to the hybrid technology. It took vision to see that the technology
was within reach and that climate change and the rise of gasoline prices would bring
about su¢ ent demand for hybrid automobiles to make this venture protable.
Of course, the Toyota-way and the technological lead the company has established
in hybrid technology is a spectacular example of successful leadership. At the time
when a leader commits the company to a particular strategy, it is not obvious whether
the strategy will succeed. There are many examples of failed strategies. There is
always an element of luck in a successful strategy. The Toyota gamble on the hybrid
technology could have failed, had oil prices stayed low for a longer period, or had
technological progress accelerated the arrival of cheaper and more e¢ cient electric
motor technologies. Had this been the case, Toyota might have had to backtrack
on its commitment. And had such hesitations been expected by Toyota engineers,
researchers, mid-level managers, and workers, the coordination of all these agents
activities around the hybrid project might have been more di¢ cult. Thus an important
element of leadership is the credibility of the proposed strategy and the commitment of
management to stay the course. It is not just that leaders have to dene a direction for
their company, but they have to make it credible for followers that they are willing to
go along. This involves both good communication and conviction, so that followers can
rest assured that the strategy will not be modied on the rst signs that the strategy
might be misguided. These elements are missing from the Rotemberg and Saloner
analysis, but we will return to them in the next section.
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3.2 Leading by example
The next important economic analysis of leadership is ?, who considers leading by
example. Hermalins model also involves moral hazard by followers, but the leaders
approach to motivating his team members is to lead by example. A key interest of
his analysis is to show how leadership by example works in situations where agents
are self-interested. The main building block Hermalin relies on is the leaders private
information about the return to e¤ort for the team as a whole. By exerting high
e¤ort himself, the team leader signals to his members that there is a high payo¤ for
the individuals in the team to exerting e¤ort. Interestingly, in his model the leaders
signaling activity, which derives from his informational advantage, can result in more
e¢ cient outcomes than if all team members were equally informed. The reason is
that the signaling encourages followers to also provide e¤ort and thus overcomes their
tendency to shirk.
Leading by example is a fundamental element of leadership, which is stressed in
many di¤erent contexts. Thus, a political leader is more likely to get support and
loyalty from followers if he is not seen to enrich himself in o¢ ce. Similarly, a CEO who
is helping himself to too many perks is not in a good position to get his subordinates
to implement a painful cost-cutting program. Indeed, some CEOs have voluntarily
given up their stock options and cut their salary when their rm hit a rough patch, as
a way of convincing their subordinates to accept a pay cut in order to save the rm.
Putting in long hours at the o¢ ce, especially when the rm is facing an unexpected
major problem or decision, is also a way for the leader to show that he cares about the
rm and others involved in the rm.
Leading by example is not necessarily tied in a direct way to the notion that the
leader has private information on the value of e¤ort for the organization. It may simply
be a signal that the leader cares about workers as well. One important observation of
Hermalins in this respect is that the leader is only willing to lead by example if his
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compensation is designed to do so. In small organizations, Hermalin shows that the
leaders share of prots should be proportionately less than the leaders e¤ort, while in
larger organizations it should be proportionately larger. This nding may be relevant
to the US corporate environment of the past two decades: when CEO pay reaches the
extremely high levels seen in many US corporations today, this compensation could
make it more di¢ cult for the CEO to lead by example. The pay is simply so high that
employees are likely to conclude that the CEO is just working hard for the money.
The analyses of Rotemberg and Saloner (1993, 2000)?? and ? focus mostly on
the public good provision aspect of leadership and not so much on the leaders role in
coordinating the various activities of the rm. It worth noting that this focus on public
good provision points to leadership models that are quite close to Japanese corporate
leadership ideas. Its emphasis is on a long-termist perspective for management, putting
the organizations welfare ahead of shareholder value, the importance of communication
and eliciting continuous improvements, and nally leadership by example and through
pay moderation.
3.3 Leadership, coordination, conviction, and execution
More recently, several contributions, including our own ?, have put the spotlight more
on the coordination role of the leader. Along these lines, ? have extended Hermalins
analysis by adding another element of successful leadership: the ability of a leader to
rally support to be able to make the changes he desires. They consider a model where
the leaders ability to bring about change depends rst on how successfully he can com-
municate to followers that change is feasible and desirable, and second on the leaders
level of support from activists who join his cause. That is, in their model followers
make a rst move by deciding whether or not they want to lend their support to the
leader. Then, the leader commits to a direction, and nally the undecided potential
followers choose whether they want to follow the leader. An important observation
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that emerges from their analysis is that the mere expectation that a leader will be suc-
cessful can bring about success. That is, their model generates multiple equilibribria.
If all the followers believe the leader will fail, then indeed he will fail, as he cannot get
enough activists to join him in the rst place. On the other hand, even if the leader is
not particularly able or is not proposing a promising strategy for the organization, he
can succeed if the followers expect him to succeed and join him en masse as activists.
Majumdar and Mukand argue that in this context the best type of leader for the or-
ganization is one who is motivated to act in part but not wholly in self interest. His
private interest (or ambition) will get him to take initiatives more readily, but it will
also make it harder for him to rally activists who do not share the same interests.
? consider a leadership problem in a two-period model where information arrives
sequentially in both periods. The leaders objective is rst of all coordination getting
followers to take actions that are complementary to his  and second adaptation 
implementing an overall strategy for the organization that is best suited to the rms
environment in the second period. The leadership facet they focus on is communication.
But, in contrast to Rotemberg and Saloner, they emphasize top-down communication.
They point to a basic trade-o¤ for the leader in communicating his mission-statement
for the rm: if he sets too precise milestones and denes the rms strategy in too
specic terms, he takes the risk that he will have to execute the strategy in the future,
even when it no longer appears desirable to him in the face of new information. By
stating somewhat vague goals for the rm he keeps more options open and can adapt the
execution of the strategy to a changing environment. However, the vaguer the mission
statement, the less the leader is able to convince the followers to take a complementary
action.
In other words, the leader can only gain credibility by being su¢ ciently specic.
Communicating convincingly and credibly incurs costs, which explains why many CEOs
are reluctant to do this. The more stable the environment the rm is in, the easier it
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is for the CEO to be specic and the more e¤ectively he can lead by communicating
the rms strategy precisely. But a more uncertain environment, according to their
analysis, calls for a more cautious and hesitant approach. Thus, what might appear
to be a failure of leadership a reluctance to commit rmly to a given strategymay
actually be the best way of steering the rm through uncertain times. Their analysis
provides one important illustration of the fact that there is no uniquely appropriate
leadership style or method. The approach to leadership fundamentally depends on the
circumstances the rm nds itself in. We return to this somewhat self-evident but
nevertheless important observation in the section below.
Another direction economists have pursued recently is to identify individual charac-
teristics, preferences, or personality traits that make some people particularly e¤ective
leaders. A widely accepted view, echoed to some extent in Parsonsanalysis of e¤ec-
tive leadership and in the economistswriting we have reviewed above, is that a good
leader is foremost a team player. Interestingly, however, ? nd evidence that some-
what contradicts this view in a rst study of CEO characteristics based on a detailed
data set of candidates for CEO positions in private equity funded rms. Although the
headhunting rm from which Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen received the data had
designed its questionaires partly to be able to identify the team players as promising
candidates for CEO positions, the authors nd that the CEOs who tended to have
better performance were the more self-assured CEOs with exceptional hard/execution
related skills. These ndings are consistent with recent theoretical analyses that have
highlighted the potential benets of CEO overcondence.
In an early paper exploring the implications of CEO overcondence, ? proposes
a model in which managerial overcondence helps attract and retain employees with
similar beliefs. This is a model of the well known notion of leadership neatly put in the
old proverb he who loves me, follows me.Applied to leadership in organizations, this
facet of leadership is most relevant at the founding stage of the rm when investors
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and employees have to decide whether they want to commit themselves to this venture.
In a di¤erent context, ? explore the benets of overcondence in a model similar to
Hermalins, which involves a moral hazard in teams problem. An overcondent leader
tends to work even harder than Hermalins rational leader and this may help overcome
free-riding by other team members.
Finally, the study by ? also emphasizes the potential benets of leader overcon-
dence. They study a similar problem of leadership by communication as in ?, with the
di¤erence that the cost to the leader of communicating too much information is that
followers may respond to this information by choosing actions which force the leader
to move away from his preferred strategy. They then show that in this context leader
overcondence (or, self-condence in their terminology) may help the leader to stick to
his guns and bring followers around his preferred strategy.
As this quick tour of the economic literature reveals, several important facets of
leadership have been analyzed by economists, the most important ones being commu-
nication and to some extent vision. Conspicuously absent from this literature, however,
is any discussion of the idea that a successful leader must know how to empower others.
Also, the elements of execution and integrity while tangentially related to the discus-
sions on CEO compensation on the one hand, and to overcondence on the other,
have not been explored in much depth. Moreover, all these early contributions only
focus on one or two elements at a time. Finally, none of these contributions explore in
any depth what we believe is a fundamental issue for leadership: the credibility of the
leaders vision, in settings where the leader is expected to change course in the face
of changes in the rms environment. The next section outlines a general conceptual
framework based on our paper ? that has at its core this credibility problem, but that




The model we outline in this section sheds light on what we believe to be a fundamental
problem of leadership, namely how the leader can credibly convey that he will stay the
course so long as a change in strategy is not clearly warranted by new events. The
e¤ectiveness of leadership depends on the leaders ability to convey that he will do as
best he can to stick to the proposed path for the organization. It is only when followers
have the condence that the rm is committed to a strategy that they are willing to
rally around the leaders mission-statement for the organization.
The framework we consider has one leader and many followers, which we take to
be a continuum indexed by i for analytical simplicity. In contrast to the previous
analyses discussed above, this framework applies most clearly to large organizations,
where the typical agents behavior has a negligible impact on the organization as a
whole. The main advantage of focusing on large organizations is that we can abstract
from the complexities of gaming inside organizations. The organizations environment
is summarized in the parameter , which a¤ects payo¤s. The leader and followers
start with di¤erent information or beliefs about the true value of . This reects the
idea that most agents in a large organization only have local information about their
own department or their market segment, and while the leader has access to global
information, he is not fully informed about all the individual activities the rm is
engaged in.
The leaders primary role in a large organization is to delineate the overall strategy
for the rm. This is captured formally by letting the leader move rst and announcing
what he believes the environment is, L, to which the rm should try to adapt to.
Thus, in this framework a strategy is summarized by the goal set for the organization
to adapt as closely as possible to the perceived environment L. This is admittedly a
somewhat abstract representation of a leaders mission statement for the organization
or of the leaders vision. Su¢ ce it to say that the merit of this abstract formulation
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is generality. Many di¤erent strategies in di¤erent contexts can be represented in this
way.
Of course the leaders vision L is not a fully accurate representation of the en-
vironment and the organization is uncertain as to the true state of the environment.
This idea is captured by letting L be a random variable, which is only equal to the
true environment on average. For analytical simplicity we take this random variable
to be normally distributed: L  N (; 1).
The followersown information about the environment is given by i  N (; 2).
They use this information along with the leaders mission statement to determine what
action ai they should take. Finally, after the followers have moved the leader receives
new information about the environment in the form of a signal SL  N (; 22) and
then he chooses his own action aLwhich can be thought of the organizations overall
course of action based on his updated beliefs about .
Several immediate questions arise. First, why do followers take their own informa-
tion into account at all? Why not just rely on the global information of the leader?
The simple answer is that followers value not just the benets of coordination but also
the benets of adaptation. But, more interestingly, even if followers only cared about
coordination they still need to be able to forecast what the leaders ultimate choice aL
will be, and for that their own information may be helpful. Second, why does the leader
pay any attention to the signal SL? Again, the leader and the organization as a whole
care about adaptation to the environment. To the extent that the original mission-
statement L turns out to be maladapted, the leader will want to change course even if
this comes at the expense of some mis-coordination. Importantly, however, when the
leader makes the nal choice aL he no longer has to worry about how his choice will
a¤ect followersactions ai, as these actions have already been taken. There is thus a
fundamental time-consistency problem for the leader: if he could commit to a choice
function aL(SL) at the time when he communicates his mission statement he would
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want to do so, as his ex-ante choice will inuence how followers act and will therefore
be di¤erent from his ex-post choice.
Formally, the objective function for all the agents in the organization can be taken
to be:
i =  (ai   aL)2  
Z
j
(aj   a)2dj   (aL   )2 for i 2 [0; 1] [ fLg (1)
This objective reects three concerns for all agents: i) coordination with the leader,
or taking an action that is close to the organizations strategy; ii) coordination among
followers, and; iii) adaptation to the environment .2
With this objective function, followers need to forecast the ultimate strategy of the
organization aL to be able to determine their own best response ai. If they think that
the leaders ultimate choice aL is very sensitive to SL they will put very little weight
on the leaders mission statement L and more weight on their own information. As a
result, the organization will not be well coordinated and there will be a large loss from




will be large. This observation captures in a simple way the concern CEOs and share-
holders have with potential failures of leadership. If the rm is not seen to be committed
to a clear strategy, there is a risk that there will be lots of coordination failures. More-
over, this risk is highest when senior management is seen to be hesitant and to be
waiting for new information before deciding on the overall course for the company. A
clear implication is that CEOs should not try to ne-tune the rms strategy too much;
in other words, that the best is the enemy of the good.
But how can CEOs credibly convey that they will stay the course? We explore two
2This basic conceptual framework is similar to the model of organizations by ?, which also considers
the organizational tradeo¤ between achieving greater coordination and greater adaptation. However,
in their model agents communicate directly with each other and there is no leader.
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mechanisms. The rst is a form of overcondence of the leader, which we refer to as
resoluteness or conviction. This is modeled by assuming that the leader overestimates
the precision of his prior information. That is, the leader believes that L has variance
2p  1. By attaching too high an informational value to L the leader will put less
weight on new information SL so that his mission statement has more credibility. This
is why conviction brings credibility.
This is an intuitive and widespread idea. Good leaders are often described to be
strong and to have strong convictions along with great vision. In our framework this
means that they trust their opinion or information more than those of others and
therefore they will not easily be swayed to change course. This mechanism is related to
the role of overcondence discussed in the contributions in the previous section. But
resoluteness plays a di¤erent role here and is also more specic than overcondence.
It plays a di¤erent role, as it serves as a commitment device to achieve greater
coordination. And it is more specic, as it is precisely overcondence with respect to
prior information that matters. In other words, what matters is the leaders initial
conviction, or belief, that he is right. This is what Parsons refers to as the element of
integrity. Note, however, that if the leader was overcondent with respect to the value
of new information he would be even more ckle than a rational leader and he would
then undermine the credibility of his mission statement.
To summarize, this framework captures two closely linked leadership problems: the
rst is that the leader may simply have the wrong vision and chooses a path for the
company that may lead to failure; the second is that although the leader ultimately
steers the organization in the right direction his mission statement is too vague, poorly
communicated, or not fully credible, so that the organizations overall plan of action
is implemented incoherently with substantial coordination failures. The best way to
deal with these problems is to appoint a leader who is forceful, even stubborn, has
strong convictions, but who is not obstinate to the point where he is willing to take
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the company in a disastrous direction in the face of overwhelming evidence that his
chosen strategy will lead to disaster.
Interestingly, when the leaders or the followersinformation is noisier then, if any-
thing, the rm should appoint a more resolute leader. The reason is that when the
leader knows less to begin with, he is more likely to change the rms strategy in re-
sponse to new information and therefore is less able to coordinate the followers. A
more resolute leader is then desirable even if this means a greater risk of ultimately
heading in the wrong direction.
This basic framework can be augmented or modied in several di¤erent directions
without a¤ecting the fundamental leadership tradeo¤ nor the desirability of resolute
leadership. Possible modications of the objective function (1) are the following:





to reect the idea that the leader does not ultimately care only about adaptation
of the rms strategy to the environment but also about coordination with all
the followers actions. With this objective function leader resoluteness is still
desirable but less so.
2. Add the term  (   ai)2 to the followersobjective function to reect the idea
that followers also care about adaptation to the environment. This worsens co-
ordination among followers. When followers want to align their action with the
leaders, they do so knowing that the leaders action is partly based on L. Be-
cause L is known to all followers, it enables coordination. When followers want
to also align their action with the true state, however, they weight L less and
coordination deteriorates.
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3. Allow for a more general weighting of the di¤erent terms in the objective function
as follows:
 !i(ai   aL)2   !j
Z
j
(aj   a)2dj   (aL   )2:
As long as the weights on alignment and coordination in the rms objective
function are positive, leader resoluteness is always desirable. But as coordination
becomes more important relative to the benet of alignment, the marginal value
of more resoluteness rises. For rms where alignment is crucial (!i and !j small),
the optimal level of resoluteness will still be positive, but small.
4. Change followerspayo¤ to
 (ai   aL)  (a  ai)2   (aL   )2
to reect the fact that there are only private costs to mis-coordination and no
public externality costs. In this case, resoluteness is always costly. If followers
choose the degree of coordination that is best for the rm on their own, then
there is no coordination problem for the leader to resolve. The only issue the
leader is then concerned with is to choose the best-adapted mission. Rational
leaders perform this task best. This would be a model with an uninteresting role
for a leader, in our view, that does not incorporate relevant leadership challenges.
5. Introduce private and public costs to mis-coordination in the form:
 (ai   aL)2  
Z
j
(ai   aj)2dj   (aL   )2:
With this payo¤ function the optimal amount of resoluteness is also lower, as
private costs to mis-coordination now cause agents to coordinate better. But,
again, some resoluteness is still valuable.
6. Add reputation as a commitment device. One way to incorporate reputation
23
costs is to add a fourth term to the leaders payo¤ function as follows:
L =  (ai   aL)2  
Z
j
(aj   a)2dj   (aL   )2   c(aL   L)2: (2)
The fourth term introduces a penalty for the leader that is increasing the more the
leader ends up deviating from his stated mission L. This term is one way of capturing
Parsonsexecution or accountability element. A leader can be more e¤ective at coordi-
nating followersactions if he is willing to put his reputation on the line that he wont
deviate from the announced mission statement. In our framework this is equivalent to
choosing a higher c. Remarkably, as is shown in our companion article, resoluteness
remains a valuable attribute of a leader even when the leader can commit to a strategy
by staking his reputation. The reason is that a resolute leader is prepared to choose
even higher values of cin other words, is even more willing to put his reputation on
the lineas he is more condent that he is right.
To summarize, the framework we have outlined so far can account for four of the
ve key elements of leadership (at least partially) that we have singled out in the intro-
duction: rst, the element of vision is captured in the relative precision of the leaders
initial information; second, top-down communication is reected in the leaders mis-
sion statement; third, execution is captured in the leaders willingness to stake his
reputation on the successful implementation of the mission; and, fourth the element of
integrity is captured in the leaders resoluteness or condence in his initial information.
It is worth noting that overcondence is often viewed in the economics literature as a
bias that may lead individuals to make foolish mistakes. In contrast, here, the partic-
ular form of overcondence which results in resoluteness can be a desirable attribute,
as has often been noted in the management literature on leadership.
This framework can also be augmented to account for the bottom-up communication
element of leadership. To introduce a role for communication by followers it su¢ ces
to let the leaders second signal SL be an aggregate index of followersactions, which
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where " is a noise term: "  N (0; 2") which captures the quality of communication
between followers and the leader.
By introducing a two-way communication channel into our framework in this way
we obtain several major substantive changes to our analysis. First, a new tradeo¤arises
between greater coordination among followersachieved by getting followers to found
their actions less on their own private informationand less information communication
by followers to the leader. In other words, coordinated actions now have both a positive
payo¤ externality and a negative information externality. Second, followers decide to
base their actions more or less on their information depending on whether they think
that the leader is a good listener or not. If they think that the leader will put a lot
of weight on SL (by being a good listener) they expect that L will be less predictive
of the leaders nal choice of strategy aL and therefore they will be led to put more
weight on their information i. This, in turn, means that SL is more informative, which
conrms their initial belief that the leader will put more weight on SL. In other words,
this two-way communication translates into a xed point problem and gives rise to
three possible equilibria.
The rst equilibrium, which we label dictatorial equilibrium is such that the leader
pays no attention to SL at all. As a result followers only put weight on L and entirely
ignore their own information when choosing their actions. This means that the leader is
right to ignore SL, as it conveys no information. As intuition suggests, this equilibrium
always exists.
In the other two equilibria, which we label lead-by-being-led equilibria the leader
does put a lot of weight on SL with the consequence that followers actions make
SL very informative, albeit at the cost of substantial mis-coordination. One of these
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equilibria is unstable and we dont focus on it for this reason. In the lead-by-being-led
equilibrium the organization is, of course, better adapted to the environment, as it
relies on more information to determine its strategy. This equilibrium does not exist
for all parameter congurations. Basically, what is required is that the true precision
of the leaders prior are low, while the precision of agentsprivate information is high.
Also the leader should not be too resolute so that he does indeed put enough weight
on SL, and the environment should not be too uncertain so that mis-coordination costs
remain within reasonable bounds.
Interestingly, in the dictatorial equilibrium there is so much coordination by the
followers that the leader does not need to be resolute at all. However, resoluteness
can be a way of selecting the dictatorial over the lead-by-being-led equilibrium. And,
paradoxically, in the lead-by-being led equilibrium some leader resoluteness is desirable
in some situations to achieve greater coordination. This is the case when the signal
the leader sees from the followersoutput is already very precise.
In sum, the framework with two-way communication allows for situations where
it is preferable for a leader to be a good listener and to be capable of formulating
well-adapted missions, as Parsons has been emphasizing. Resoluteness is most valu-
able when there is lots of uncertainty on the true environment but the leaders prior
information is relatively accurate (in other words, when the leader has great vision).
In these situations, the leaders stubbornness may suppress followersinformation and
may lead to the wrong strategy choice for the rm, but this risk is reduced by the
leaders visionary qualities.
5 Missing Pieces
As we have already noted, one missing element from our list is empowering others. To
introduce this element into our framework requires a broader perspective on organiza-
tions than our representation of a collection of followers who act in a non-cooperative
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way based on their own information. As Parsons suggests, one important reason why
empowering others is so important is that there is a limit to how much a leader can
do.
To model leader limited attention one would have to put constraints on the leaders
ability to process information and to communicate with the whole organization. Our
representation of top-down communication in our framework is rudimentary, to say
the least. In reality, communication of an overall mission, strategy, or vision for the
organization takes a lot of face-to-face meetings during which the strategy can be
debated, explained in greater detail and better motivated. Communication in our
framework only takes the form of a message that is broadcast to the whole organization.
Many rms have such broad mission-statements posted on their websites and they
inevitably read like a shallow and bland public relations exercise.
Top-down communication is more complex and takes time. To be e¤ective, a leader
has to be able to empower others around him in this communication e¤ort. By enlisting
the support of a strong team around him he will be able to not only communicate the
mission better but also to signal the credibility of the mission by displaying the level
of support in his management team, as ? have argued. Similarly, when it comes to
the execution of the strategy, the leader will need to empower others around him to
implement all the multiple components of the strategy.
Another reason to empower ones followers is to develop their skills and knowledge
base. Followers that rigidly follow a leaders exacting instructions do not develop their
own judgement and end up contributing less to their rm than they might if they were
allowed to experiment and learn. One way to capture this idea would be to write down
a dynamic version of the model outlined above where followers could learn about the
precision of their information over time from seeing their payo¤ realizations. If they
simply followed the leaders instructions, their payo¤s would only be related to the
leaders information and would teach them nothing about their own information. But
27
if they used their private signal to develop their own course of action, seeing the results
of that action would teach them about how to use their information more e¢ ciently in
the future. In such an environment, a leader would have to balance the short-term gains
from resolute leadership generating well-coordinated outcomes against the long-term
costs of strong coordination that result in foregone learning opportunities for followers.
Although there are important benets in empowering others, this is often one di-
mension along which many leaders fail. There are several reasons why leaders tend
to be reluctant to delegate. A rst basic reason is that they are so condent in their
own vision and abilities that they do not trust their subordinates to be up to the task.
Thus, another drawback of resoluteness (besides leading to greater mis-adaptation to
the environment) may be insu¢ cient empowerment of subordinates.
A second reason is that leaders want to retain their power and fear competition
from promising younger, smarter, candidates for the job. Thus in an e¤ort to entrench
themselves they will tend to resist empowering others. This idea has been analyzed by
economists in the context of a principal-agent model, most notably by ?. It has also
been explored in a political economy context by ?, who argue that an autocratic leaders
fear of treason by their viziers is the main reason behind their time-honored practice of
appointing weak but loyal subordinates over more competent ones. Another interesting
recent analysis on this aspect of political leadership by ? points to the di¢ culty for
the leader of credibly empowering others. The leader can take power or rewards away
from his subordinates at any time and he will do so when he no longer needs them. If
his subordinates anticipate this outcome they will have reduced incentives to work in
support of the leaders mission. Myersons analysis suggests that if the leader wants
to credibly delegate power he needs to subject his authority to a third party, which
in the political context of his analysis may be a court with authority to remove the
leader. In the corporate context this role could be assigned to an independent board
of directors. Note, however, that an independent empowered board could undermine
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the leaders own credibility, which was already discussed in the introduction.
Another important and related element of leadership that is missing from our frame-
work is the process by which leaders are identied or selected. The board of directors
is charged with appointing corporate leaders, but how does the board identify a good
leader? Managers compete for leadership positions and their track-record helps es-
tablish their leadership credentials. An obvious question that arises in this context
is whether this leadership contest results in the appointment of resolute leaders. In
an interesting anlysis of this question, ? argue that overcondent managers are more
likely to be appointed CEOs. The reason is that overcondence leads these managers
to take greater risks. Even if this risk-taking leads overcondent managers to fail more
often, the pool of successful managersfrom which CEOs are pickedwill be overrepre-
sented by overcondent managers. To the extent that overcondence takes the form of
resoluteness this selection bias towards overcondent managers may be benecial for
the organization as we have argued above.
6 Conclusion
As our brief review highlights, the nascent economics literature on leadership has ana-
lyzed several important elements of leadership in organizations. Although the starting
point of most economic analyses is the Principal-Agent paradigm of the rm, the
ultimate direction of these leadership analyses is an entirely di¤erent vision of the
managerial rm, where the main problem is not so much to elicit e¤ort provision by
management (or limiting their consumption of perks) but to make sure that manage-
ment exercises leadership credibly and executes its vision of the rms mission.
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